“Does Moral Theory Create Extremism?” from The Philosopher’s Beard.
“Most people’s moral lives are full of implicit contradictions, but this should not be mistaken for a great buzzing blooming confusion that should be swept away in the name of theoretical clarity and rigour. When we try to subsume the practical domain of morality into moral theory by clearly defining the principles that count and binding them together in certain fixed constellations, we excise a great deal of actual moral life.”
I don’t often go in for analytic philosophy, but there’s a lot to be said for that approach’s directness of expression and clarity of thought. This article is a stellar example of both qualities.
The author’s conclusion is that certainty in morally complex issues (issues in which two or more moral intuitions or demands interact with or contradict each other) comes at the cost of the arbitrary foreclosure of debate, ignoring valid moral demands and situational nuance. This is a compelling and important argument, contradicting the popular view in which vacillation and uncertainty are seen as weaknesses. As the article notes, the loudest and simplest voices dictate the parameters of debate. Idealogues on both sides speak in absolutes, ignoring the fact that the premises of the other sides have validity and weight; meanwhile, those who remain earnestly conflicted are pressed out of the discussion.
It could be argued that a lack of finality of thought about a complex problem precludes action or decision. To paraphrase the article: in the case of abortion, there are two moral intuitions which seem basically reasonable, or at least arguable. On one hand, embryos are very much like other beings we give moral standing, and therefore it seems as though they deserve moral standing, which means we shouldn’t kill them. However, embryos also seem like a part of a woman’s body, and women have the right to regulate their own bodies, therefore abortion is a right of women to regulate their bodies.
Obviously, these are contradictory conclusions. I believe that you can feel the moral (emotional?) pull of one of these premises more than the other, or even feel that one of these premises has no moral weight to you, personally. You should act and believe accordingly. However, you can do so with the recognition that, while you may disagree wholeheartedly with the actions or beliefs of others who accept the opposing premise, that opposing premise is a thing which could be argued reasonably and poses a powerful moral demand.
I believe you can act effectively, even as an “extremist” or “radical,” while recognizing that moral conclusions which are foreign and seemingly wrong-headed can be legitimately drawn from valid premises. Politics, and even direct action, is a process of asserting a new hegemony and ideology. Complex moral issues can’t be solved by empirical evidence and reason alone. It’s a matter of “is-ought.” To claim that your views arise from pure reason and that the opposition has no moral ground on which to stand forecloses on the possibility of debate and prevents the ideologue from allowing his “bulletproof” views to adapt and change.
